De laatste dag van de Gentse Feesten.
Enkele tips:
Yelemani Trio
21u Baudelo.
Maria Mazzotta
21u Walter De Buckplein.
Jeremiah Jackson & The Junes
23u Baudelo.
Hier blogt uw Kameraad Harko, kwestie van iedereen die het ook maar vaag zou kunnen interesseren op de hoogte te houden. Uw kameraad blogt over de zaken die hem interesseren, zoals (religieus) erfgoed, geschiedenis, maar ook de betere muziek!
De laatste dag van de Gentse Feesten.
Enkele tips:
Yelemani Trio
21u Baudelo.
Maria Mazzotta
21u Walter De Buckplein.
Jeremiah Jackson & The Junes
23u Baudelo.
Spanje trekt vandaag naar de stembus.
Vandaag vinden in Spanje de vervroegde parlementsverkiezingen plaats. De Partido Popular staat in de startblokken om een rechtse coalitie aan de macht te brengen. Ze gaat dat ongetwijfeld proberen doen mét de fascisten van Vox. De Spaanse fascisten van Vox zijn nostalgisch naar het tijdperk Franco, ultranationalistisch, xenofoob, homofoob, transfoob. Meer Het is niet dat Vox plotseling zo populair is geworden, de peilingen geven zelfs aan dat Vox zetels gaat verliezen, maar de PP streeft nu open en bloot naar een rechts blok, mét Vox.
Gelukkig is er ook tegengewicht. Een aantal authentiek linkse partijen trekken samen naar de kiezer met Sumar.
Sumar is een heel brede coalitie.
Sumar trekt naar de kiezer met een sterk programma (pdf in link):
Economía para una vida mejor
Consumo sostenible y con derechos
Trabajo decente. Mejorar la vida de las personas trabajadoras
La transición ecológica justa, el desafío de nuestro tiempo
Por un mundo rural vivo y activo
Hábitat para la vida
Una sociedad del bienestar justa, saludable y verde
Políticas de bienestar y de cuidados
El derecho a la salud
Protección de los derechos de los niños y las niñas y de sus familias
Envejecer con autonomía y seguridad
Inclusión de personas con discapacidad
Un país para jóvenes
Migraciones. Frenar el racismo y la xenofobia
Un proyecto para ensanchar la democracia
Feminismos e igualdad
Un feminismo del 99%
Derechos y libertades LGTBI+
Democracia de calidad
Democratización y sociedad civil
Administración y buen gobierno
Modelo territorial
Un país más justo
Un modelo de Justicia
Políticas de seguridad y prevención
Memoria democrática
Un programa internacional.
España, potencia de paz y progreso
Una política exterior para cuidar la democracia y el planeta
Una Europa que proteja a las personas
Una política de desarrollo a favor de la justicia global
Una política de movilidad humana con los derechos humanos en el centro
Un proyecto de educación, universidad, conocimiento, ciencia, cultura, deporte, innovación y digitalización para la cohesión social y la transición justa y sostenible
Derecho a la educación y sistema educativo
Universidad, ciencia e innovación Cultura y deporte
GUE/NL, de partij van Europees Links, over SUMAR:
The Left in the European Parliament endorses the Sumar platform. As fellow advocates for workers’ rights, feminism and climate justice, we stand with Sumar in these crucial times and commend its dedication to tackling both inequalities and climate change.
We are living in a decisive moment that demands changes in our lives and our societies. A reality tackled head-on by Yolanda Díaz and the Ministries headed by Podemos and Izquierda Unida, who have played a decisive role in the Spanish government in response to these challenges. First, by advancing social reforms and deploying a progressive response to the cost-of-living crisis, notably by increasing the minimum wage by 47% over five years, but also by boosting key welfare programmes. This government has been one the first to force energy giants, banks and the rich to contribute to the recovery by creating a tax on windfall profits. It has also been clamping down on fake self-employment in the gig economy and has advanced workers’ rights in labour law. It has been at the forefront of the global feminist struggle, putting women’s rights and the fight against patriarchy at the centre of the political agenda, expanding abortion rights and the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community.
Such social advances were only possible because Left members of the government from Podemos and Izquierda Unida raised the level of ambition to achieve those results. Deputy Prime Minister Diaz played a particularly crucial role in promoting equality in all its facets. Sumar will now continue this project by bringing these parties and many others behind a single banner as a broad movement.
For all these reasons, The Left group is proud to count among its members Spanish representatives who played a key role in the creation of Sumar and are now fully involved in the campaign. We commend their hard work in developing a progressive programme that resonates with our values.
Now that the struggle has reached a new phase, it is more essential than ever that political platforms like Sumar are strengthened to embody the alternative against divisive right-wing rhetoric and policies. The risk of a new right and far-right government in power – in a context where they are starting to govern together at local and regional levels – is real and demands a strong response. Success in these elections would be a victory and a positive signal for the progressive movement across Europe against the alarming widespread convergence of the European right and far right.
Therefore, we extend our best wishes to all the inspiring Sumar candidates and activists and trust that their hard work to serve the people will connect strongly across the state.
Throughout the campaign, we will actively support Sumar and reaffirm our commitment to the shared principles of justice, equality, and solidarity. Together, we can work towards another Spain, another Europe, in the interests of all.
Lees ook het zeer interessante interview van de lijsttrekker van Sumar met de Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.
Progressief boegbeeld Carola Rackete maakte deze week bekend dat ze zich kandidaat stelt voor de Europese verkiezingen voor de Duitse progressieve partij Die Linke.
Carola verwierf internationale bekendheid en een onvervalste heldenstatus door haar deelname aan levensreddende acties in de Middellandse Zee. Ze stond, letterlijk, aan het roer van een schip dat de zee afvoer om mensenlevens te redden van vluchtelingen die bij de gevaarlijke oversteek in de problemen kwamen. Ze werd omwille van die heldendaden opgepakt door de Italiaanse regering. Vandaag stelt ze zich dus kandidaat voor het Europees Parlement. Woonde ik in Duitsland, ze had mijn stem.
Haar verklaring met tekst en uitleg neem ik hier integraal over:
Today, I am announcing that I’m running as an independent candidate for the European Parliament on the list of the German Left Party. This is not a decision I have taken lightly. Instead, I debated the offer with friends and colleagues from inside and outside the EU, many of whom are very active in social movements but do not hold EU passports and the privileges to engage with democratic institutions in the same way that citizens can. The situation is urgent: fascism is on the rise once again across Europe, people seeking safety are stripped of their human rights, fossil fuel corporations are making outrageous profits while people endure the cost-of-living crisis, we all feel the consequences of the escalating climate crisis around the globe. At a moment like this, I believe that movements striving for justice cannot afford to ignore state institutions.
The sixth mass extinction and climate breakdown are challenges that humanity has never faced before. And they are not accidents. They were caused and are fuelled by a massive power imbalance between the interests of fossil fuel corporations and the public. The next years will be critical, as social injustice and ecological damage spiral out of control – unless we as actors of civil society force governments to take drastic actions to create the conditions for equal well-being for everyone.
The corporations which have recklessly caused the climate crisis must be held accountable; they have to be socialised and their money used to finance a just transition. At the same time, we need to cancel debt of the Global South, share access to technology and provide safety for people who are forced to leave their homes. We cannot afford the tax avoidance of the rich, we have no time to waste on corporate green-washing and false solutions (like carbon offsetting and biodiversity credits). Instead, we need to act with decisiveness and truthfulness to fight for equal power structures, transparency and democracy.
What happens in Brussels may feel very far-removed from everyday life in Catania, Krakow or Rovaniemi, but the decisions that are taken by European institutions affect not only people in Europe, but also far beyond. As a person who is deeply rooted in social and environmental justice movements, I have never had any desire to work within state institutions. However, I feel that strong links between the movements in the streets and the European Parliament are urgently needed. I believe that this position can be used to make movements’ voices heard in parliament, but also to strengthen social movements by sharing information, resources and media attention whilst acting as a watchdog for what is happening within the institutions. I will strive to be a transparent, critical member of parliament. I will be accountable to civil society and justice movements in Europe and beyond.
In social movements, we often talk about a strategic “ecosystem approach”, in which groups work together for their common goal, but take action according to their own experiences, skills and specific focus. At this moment, in this movement ecosystem in Germany, an institutional representation of the movement is lacking. I think the German Left Party can fill this gap, as it is emerging from an internal crisis and is in the process of re-positioning itself as a progressive justice party that unites the interests of the oppressed. Consequently, the party approached me for this candidacy, to try and strengthen its ties with civil society. Whether this will be successful depends on the engagement of movement actors. I believe we should not stand by as spectators.
Link.
Die Linke trekt naar de verkiezingen met een sterk team.
Gentse Feesten dag 9, het laatste weekend is ingezet.
Veel aanraders vandaag:
Uitreiking Prijs van de Democratie & Jaap Kruithof
20u Walter De Buckplein.
De Prijs voor de Democratie 2023 gaat naar de stakende werknemers van Delhaize. De prijs Jaap Kruithof is, ook heel terecht, voor de internationale burgerbeweging Extinction Rebellion.
Gaïsha
20u Baudelo.
Karagöz en Haçivat / Turks schimmenspel door Luk De Bruyker
22u Baudelo.
Nationale Feestdag, Gentse Feesten dag 8.
Op deze nationale feestdag staan we weer veel dingen op het programma.
De enige tip voor vandaag: DJ neo-rej, 0u, Baudelo.
Woensdag, Gentse Feesten dag 6.
Het wordt moeilijk kiezen tussen Sint-Jacobs en Baudelo. De aanraders voor vandaag.
Vieux Farka Touré
20u15 Walter De Buckplein.
Jeremiah Jackson & SVN
20u30 Baudelo.
Kuejo Blaq
21u30 Baudelo.
Bibi Tanga & The Selenites
22u Walter De Buckplein.
Orkestar Braka Kadrievi
23u Baudelo.
Guedra Guedra
23u30 Walter De Buckplein.
Omar Dahl
0u30 Baudelo.
3phaz
0u15 Walter De Buckplein.
DJ Cheb Runner
1u Walter De Buckplein.
DJ Yalla Soundsystem
2u Walter De Buckplein.
Dinsdag, Gentse Feesten dag 5.
Vandaag heel wat Global Grooves op de Gentse Feesten.
DJ Sina
19u Baudelo.
Skyblasters
20u15 Walter De Buckplein.
Asifeh
21u Baudelo.
Alogte Oho & His Sounds Of Joy
22u Walter De Buckplein.
Maguaré
0u Walter De Buckplein.
DJ Joga Bonito
1u Walter De Buckplein.
Maandag, Gentse Feesten dag 4.
De aanraders voor vandaag:
21u Baudelo.
21u30 Baudelo.
Zondag, Gentse Feesten dag 3.
Veel bekijkenswaardige optredens vandaag.
Enkele aanraders:
20u45 Walter De Buckplein.
23u40 Walter De Buckplein.
23u Baudelohof.
0u Baudelohof.
Yilmaz Koçak, Raşit Kula en Bülent Fani maken er een grandioos feest van.
Zaterdag, Gentse Feesten dag 2.
Vandaag staan er twee optredens op het programma die ik ten zeer aanbeveel.
20u Baudelo.
0u Baudelo.
Vrijdag, Gentse Feesten dag 1.
Er staan fantastische dingen op het programma.
Enkele aanraders:
De fenomenale muziek van Walter De Buck is een hedendaags jasje.
22u Walter De Buckplein.
Tijdens de Feesten kan je naar fantastische theatervoorstelling, waaronder de conference van Wim Claeys.
De Gentse Feesten, dat betekent ook Gentse Feesten Debatten.
Al meer dan 30 jaar organiseren Democratie 2000 en Trefpunt de enige echte Gentse Feesten debatten.
Dit jaar onder hoofding "We plooien niet".
met Paul Goossens (econoom, auteur “De ongelijkheidsmachine”), Dominique Willaert (gewezen artistiek leider Victoria DeLuxe, auteur van “Dansen op een ziedende vulkaan”), Kathleen Van Brempt (Europees parlementslid Vooruit), Sara Matthieu (Europees parlementslid Groen), Katrien Neyt (Gewestelijk secretaris ABVV Oost-Vlaanderen), Veerle Verleyen (adjunct algemeen secretaris ACV Puls), Wouter Ryckbosch (Hoofddocent geschiedenis VUB), Peter Mertens (algemeen secretaris PVDA; federaal volksvertegenwoordiger, auteur)
met Lien Bruggeman (Nationaal medisch coördinator, Fedasil), Hans Verrept (FOD Volksgezondheid, Celverantwoordelijke Interculturele Bemiddeling & Beleidsondersteuning), Rita Vanobberghen (Geneeskunde voor het volk, arts), Ellen Verryt (Dokters van de Wereld, regiocoördinator), Koen Van Praet (Open Netwerk vzw)
met Jan Dumolyn (Hoogleraar geschiedenis UGent), Maika De Keyser (Historica KUL), Robrecht Vanderbeeken (filosoof), Saida Isbai (ACV-Puls),Lieve Franssen (Brussels Brecht-Eislerkoor, lid Raad van Bestuur Koninklijke Vlaamse Schouwburg), Katrien Reist (co-coördinator State of the Arts)
met Simon Clement (activist actief in de Gentse woonbeweging), Hannah Aziza Ghulam Farag (ACV Puls), Jolien Paeleman (Extinction Rebellion), Stefanie De Bock (Vredesactie), Matilde De Cooman (LABO Vzw), Jens Beresole (Opbouwwerker SAAMO Zelzate)
met Tijs Laenen (KUL, Tilburg University), Koen Abts (KUL), Angeline Van Den Rijse (AC- ABVV), Michelle Ginée (sociaal werker OCMW), Peter Terryn (activist, weikcafe ‘groot ongelijk’), Karin Debroey (ACV studiedienst)
met Brecht De Smet (Vakgroep Conflict en Development UGent), Aviel Verbruggen (Professor emeritus energie- en milieu-economie UA), Sven van Elst (directeur coöperatieve vennootschap ASTER), Onno Vandewalle (volksvertegenwoordiger PVDA), Meyrem Almaci (volksvertegenwoordiger Groen), Aislinn D'hulster (vakgroep economie UGent)
met Jurgen Masure (Secretaris en BBTK bhv, auteur “Mens voorbij Markt”), Francine Mestrum (doctor in de sociale wetenschappen, voorzitter Global Social Justice), Rik Pinxten (Prof. Em. Antropologie UGent, auteur “Humanisme in woelige tijden”), Esmeralda Borgo (Zelfstandig onderzoekster en journaliste, actief in milieubeweging), Gie Goris (journalist, auteur, ex-hoofdredacteur MO-magazine), Myriam Vander Stichele (onderzoeker SOMO Amsterdam; gespecialiseerd in de financiële sector en handel), Eric Corijn (stadssocioloog, cultuurfilosoof en sociaal wetenschapper. hoogleraar Stadsstudies COSMOPOLIS VUB, auteur van “Gramsci lezen” en “Vlaanderen Ontwaak!”); Ludo De Brabander (vredesactivist, woordvoerder Vrede Vzw, columnist, auteur van “Als de NAVO de passie preekt” (samen met Georges Spriet) “Oorlog zonder Grenzen” “Het Koerdisch Utopia” “Voordat de bom valt” en “Oorlogskoorts”
Speciaal voor 11 juli een zeer interessant artikel uit het Engelstalige progressieve tijdschrift Jacobin.
Jan Dumolyn, professor middeleeuwse geschiedenis aan de UGent, schreef een zeer lezenswaardige analyse.
Between 1300 and 1600, only the Italian city-states could rival the artisanal industries, commerce, and artistic production of the southern Low Countries. This is common knowledge to anyone familiar with the history of art.
Its medieval townscape is still visible to the foreign visitor in popular historic Belgian cities such as Bruges, Brussels, Ghent, and Antwerp. Equally famous are the region’s visual artists of the so-called Northern Renaissance: Jan van Eyck, Pieter Bruegel, and Peter Paul Rubens, not to mention lesser-known female artists like Clara Peeters.
It is less well known that between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries, there was a very high frequency of popular collective action in principalities like the County of Flanders, the Duchy of Brabant, and the Prince-Bishopric of Liège. Indeed, fourteenth-century Flanders was probably the preindustrial region with the highest intensity and frequency of workers’ protest and civil warfare.
This article will give readers an overview of social unrest in Flanders during the Middle Ages and discuss the factors behind it against the wider backdrop of popular protest in medieval Europe.
The southern part of the medieval Low Countries roughly covered the area of what is today Belgium and Luxembourg as well as the most northern regions of France and a small southern part of the Dutch kingdom. It was a densely urbanized area. By 1300, the share of the population living in towns is estimated to have been somewhere between 30 and 40 percent — much higher than the average in medieval Europe.
The two most famous upheavals were the rising that led in 1302 to the Battle of Courtrai, in which a militia mostly composed of rebellious Bruges artisans defeated a French chivalric force that was the strongest army in medieval Europe, and the revolt of Maritime Flanders between 1323 and 1328.
In 1297, under the pretext of a conflict over feudal rights with his vassal Count Guy of Dampierre, the king of France had his troops invade the prosperous County of Flanders. His real objective was to get hold of the region’s economically booming cities and the fiscal income they provided. The Flemish merchant class supported the French invaders, having been in conflict with their count for some time.
The artisans of Ghent and Bruges at first remained passive toward the invasion. In 1301, however, they began protesting against unjust taxation. The members of the Flemish comital family who still held on to a small part of the county saw this as an opportunity to forge an alliance with Pieter de Coninck, a weaver and rebel leader of Bruges.
On July 11, 1302, this alliance of “odd bedfellows” destroyed the French army. Although the Flemish had to negotiate an unfair peace treaty, they remained independent. Most importantly, common artisans now also had representation in the urban governments.
Some years later, however, the comital family felt increasingly uneasy about their alliance with the workers and small producers and started siding once again with the patricians and the French royal family. This caused new unrest among the working masses, and ever more so among the peasants, who also had reasons to revolt against taxation.
Between 1323 and 1328, this led to a new major revolt that united the lower and middle classes of most of Flanders against the new count, who was at one point held prisoner by his own subjects. But he eventually crushed the rebellion with French aid, and the cities and rural districts once again had to pay heavy fines.
Historians often see the popular victory of 1302 as a key moment for the securing of Flemish autonomy from the region’s feudal overlord, France. In this light, it has frequently been misrepresented as a national struggle rather than a class one. Yet it was primarily caused by deep social tensions between the urban artisan and merchant classes of Flanders.
The revolt of 1323–28 is usually compared to the French Jacquerie of 1358 or the English Peasants’ Revolt of 1381. It is now generally acknowledged that all three of these so-called “peasant risings” also included urban workers and members of the middle classes.
Yet Marxist medieval historians have tended to focus on rural society, trying to anatomize the productive relations of feudal society almost exclusively in the rural context. In fact, social revolts were much more frequent in the towns and cities of Flanders, Brabant, and Liège than in the countryside, and the same can also be said of other European regions.
Medieval towns generally do not receive the same attention as the countryside from the viewpoint of historical materialism. They do not easily fit into a conventional view of the feudal mode of production as a system with a class of lords appropriating the surplus from peasants under the weight of extra-economic pressure, whether those peasants were classified as serfs or as freemen or as occupying a wide range of juridical and social statuses located between those two poles.
Of course, there is some justification for this focus on rural life. In the average region of medieval Europe, the population living in towns did not exceed 10 percent of the total. But cities were not “non-feudal islands in a sea of feudalism,” as the historian Michael Postan once put it. They were integral to the social formations of medieval Europe, certainly from the eleventh century onward.
The classic Marxist debates on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, involving figures such as Maurice Dobb, Paul Sweezy, and Robert Brenner, did not have to say a lot about the medieval town. The leading Marxist historian of medieval society, Rodney Hilton, only systematically reflected on the modes of production in the small market towns of England and France toward the end of his career. With some justification, he considered these towns to have been the most typical forms of urban life in this period.
This leaves the Marxist approach to history with a paradox. Medieval urban economy and society constituted a distinctive social formation combining different relations of production, particularly in the more important centers such as Florence, Venice, Ghent, or Bruges. Yet town and countryside were also in constant interaction.
City dwellers obviously depended for foodstuffs on the surplus produced by the peasants of the surrounding countryside. The larger the population of a town, the larger the hinterland that produced for it.
The same point held true for sources of energy and construction material such as wood and peat, and for many raw materials that were used in the artisanal industries of the towns. Moreover, since the level of mortality was always higher than birth rates in the preindustrial city, urban areas also needed a constant influx of migrants to maintain or increase their population.
We can use the medieval County of Flanders as an example of a feudal society with a very strong urban element that will shed light on the wider theoretical problem. Flanders was situated in a flat landscape, at the delta of several major rivers, and in a central position between France, Germany, and Britain. At first underdeveloped and infertile, this swampy region on the North Sea experienced spectacular economic growth during the Middle Ages, especially from the eleventh century onward.
This growth was the result of two factors: a strong and steady rise in agricultural productivity, which created a demographic surplus, and the development of a vigorous export-oriented textile industry and an urban service economy for trade. While the first element was also present in some other European regions, the second was much less common, even in Italy, where the towns were less industrial than those of Flanders.
In cities like Ghent and Ypres, between a third and a half of the population worked in one industrial sector, the cloth industry, by 1200. Bruges became the hub for north-west European trade and its connection to the Mediterranean.
Early medieval growth in the period between c. 700 and c. 1150 seems to have been primarily created by elite demand, as Chris Wickham has convincingly argued. The warrior class and the clergy appropriated the agricultural surplus produced when the European economy began to undergo a gradual revival from the eight century onward. They used that surplus to purchase luxury products and imported commodities in general.
From the eleventh century, however, city dwellers themselves became a growing domestic market for their own artisanal production. At the same time, commodities produced in regions like Flanders also reached extensive interregional and international markets.
However, the rise of medieval industry markets did not imply the existence of capitalism. In Marxist terminology, “simple commodity production” refers to an artisan mode of manufacturing. The producer owns the means of production, which may often be just a small workshop, some tools, and a modest amount of raw material with which to make his finished product. This commodity is subsequently sold on the market, often directly to the consumers.
Medieval shoemakers or bakers are clear examples of petty commodity producers in their pure and simple form. But in the case of Flemish cloth production for export, the division of labor and the relations within the sphere of production arising from it were more complicated.
While commercial capital did not directly intervene in the production process, merchants had a firm grip on small producers through credit and their ability to set prices for raw materials and finished products, not to mention their control of political power in the towns. This remained the case even if the small producers formally possessed their own means of production. For their part, wage workers were dependent on both merchants and master artisans who acted as entrepreneurs.
In the years between 1050 and 1150, roughly speaking, the “communal movement” resulted in a high degree of political and legal autonomy for the urban areas. This was not a real social revolution that brought a new class to power through violent confrontation.
In most Flemish cities, princes and the early patrician elites of merchants and landowners shared a common interest in the growth of the urban economy, which led to profits for the merchant class and greater fiscal income for the prince. Only in ecclesiastical towns like Tournai, situated right next to Flanders, were there some violent clashes when ruling bishops did not want to share power with the burghers. We can observe the same pattern in a number of other ecclesiastical towns located in France and the Holy Roman Empire.
However, when a succession crisis arose in Flanders in 1127–28, as described by the eloquent chronicler Galbert of Bruges, it was the major cities such as Bruges, Ghent, and Saint-Omer that acted as kingmakers. By then, they had already developed considerable economic and military power and political influence that was too strong for the nobles to successfully resist.
The great majority of Flemish peasants had obtained personal freedom by the thirteenth century, and the seignorial power of the nobility dwindled. The ruling class in the communes consisted of merchants, descendants of seignorial officials, local knights, and urban landowners. Urban society polarized, especially in the years between 1150 and 1300. The urban merchant classes took advantage of cheap migrant labor from the countryside to keep wages low and accumulate capital.
Food had to be imported in ever larger quantities to feed the urban workforce. Prices increased and wages lagged behind. Between 1225 and 1250, the first labor strikes are documented in towns like Douai and Ghent, earlier than anywhere else in medieval Europe. At first, artisans were not organized, or organized merely in religious confraternities. The merchant elites who jealously monopolized political power forbade independent craft guilds or even meetings of workers.
Particularly in large towns such as those in medieval Flanders, the combination of small commodity production and commercial capitalism thus fundamentally changed the outlook of the feudal social formation across the entire region. Class structure became more complicated than the opposition between lords and peasants alone. Already by the twelfth century, many merchant capitalists and urban landowners were becoming wealthier than the nobility. A number of commodity producers obtained middle-class status and also sought political power.
Making use of the craft guild as an organizational form, artisans demanded institutional autonomy, control over the production process, and participation in urban government. The constant flow of rural migrants provided the towns with an army of proletarians, who populated the fast-growing suburbs from the twelfth century onward.
Merchants, small entrepreneurs, and wage workers developed triangular class relations and formed various temporary political alliances. Guildsmen working for the local market were less proletarianized than those in the cloth industry. Working women in particular, often single, were the most exploited of all urban social groups.
Yet it was a united front of small entrepreneurs, retailers, and wage workers that faced the patrician regimes in successive waves of revolt around 1280 and 1302. In the most industrious cities like Bruges, Ghent, Mechelen, and Liège, more popular governments came to power — that is to say, ones that included artisan representatives (even if they belonged to the richer layers of their guilds).
The next two and a half centuries were marked by a constant struggle between these “popular fronts” or “burgher movements” on the one hand and the class of commercial capitalists on the other. The latter often received support from wealthy petty commodity producers — in the luxury industries, for example — as well as from princely, noble, and ecclesiastical power.
The fourteenth century was the apogee of guild power in Flanders and Liège. Ghent became the center of artisan strength in medieval Europe. In the Brabantine towns, where the alliance between the nobles and the patrician class was stronger, the struggle was more difficult, developing after 1360 and sometimes only succeeding by the beginning of the fifteenth century.
While it was the urban classes that led the social and political struggles of the medieval Low Countries, the free peasants of the coastal areas also played an active role at times. A notable example came in the uprising of Maritime Flanders between 1323 and 1328, as well as in 1379–85 and 1436–38, two periods when large parts of the countryside openly revolted against princely rule.
Free peasants also developed a culture of village meetings and rose up against excessive fiscal burdens, often siding with rebellious urban artisans. In other periods, however, these two social groups had opposing interests. Cities fiscally exploited their hinterlands, and the urban workforce saw rural industries, where wages were lower, as unfair competition that they wanted to suppress.
The rule of popular leader James of Artevelde (1338–45) as captain general of Ghent marked the high point of Flemish rebellious power. Although Artevelde was not a craftsman himself and belonged to the urban upper class of Ghent, he managed to obtain the support of the textile workers and most of the other artisans.
At the beginning of the Hundred Years’ War, he sided with England against France, even though Flanders was a fief of the French monarchy. This was because the import of English wool was vital to the Flemish production of woolen cloths. Artevelde’s followers also took power in Bruges for several years.
During the second half of the fourteenth century, the textile industries of Flanders and Brabant entered a period of crisis. There was growing competition from England and Tuscany as well as from smaller towns and rural producers. A city like Bruges mainly reoriented its economic activity to the production of durable consumption goods and luxuries, making it the ideal place for painters like Jan van Eyck or Hans Memling to settle.
The Burgundian dynasty assumed power in most of the Netherlandish principalities between the late fourteenth and the mid-fifteenth century. This was part of a wider pattern in medieval Europe whereby the feudal state became stronger in relation to its subjects through the interplay of war and taxation. This increased strength applied to lords and cities alike.
During the fifteenth century, the power of the political guilds in Flanders was in retreat. Textile workers became ever more isolated from the commodity producers in other sectors who worked for internal markets. At the same time, the upper layers of the urban elites fused with an expanding cohort of state officials and nobles who profited from what we might term “state feudalism” — a more centralized form of surplus extraction through the appropriation of tax rather than rent. The fiscal burden placed by the feudal state upon its subjects became heavier during the later Middle Ages.
There was another generalized wave of uprisings between 1477 and 1492, after Duke Charles the Bold died on a battlefield against the Swiss, having overstretched in his plans for Burgundian expansion. The Flemish and Brabantine town-dwellers took advantage of the weakness of his young successor, Mary of Burgundy, to revolt. They demand the restoration of their former privileges.
Mary subsequently married Maximilian of Austria. After her untimely death in 1482, this marriage alliance brought the Habsburg dynasty to power in Flanders, but only after ten years of civil war. The opposition to Habsburg rule consisted not only of the popular classes in the cities but also of large sections of the elites, including many nobles.
In 1515, under the reign of Maximilian’s grandson Charles V, the Netherlands became part of the global Spanish-Habsburg empire. In a number of confrontations between 1525 and 1540, this centralized authority, much stronger than what had existed before, defeated the guildsmen.
The craft workers of the southern Netherlandish principalities had achieved a degree of political power in their towns, especially the larger ones, that was unrivaled in any other region of medieval Europe before 1400, with the possible exception of the Rhineland and some Italian city-states. By the middle of the sixteenth century, that power had been significantly weakened. Yet the Netherlands would soon produce a new wave of revolt in the wake of the Reformation, dealing a heavy blow to the superpower of early modern Europe, the Habsburg monarchy.
Democracy Now brengt speciaal voor 4 juli, de onafhankelijkheidsdag van de USA, de historische speech van Frederick Douglass, gebracht door James Earl Jones. Met een inleiding van Howard Zinn.